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The Way to the Specialist and Management Level of Cyber Hygiene Ini-
tiative 
Abstract: 
Cybercrime and state sponsored espionage is still growing rapidly. The number of affected 
organizations increases day by day. Some know that they are effected, some still do not 
know. The user is a main factor in cyber security incidents. No two humans are the same 
(e.g. fingerprints, skill, knowledge, attitude). The behaviour of humans is influenced by var-
ious factors. The goal of the Cyber Hygiene Initiative is to adopt internal guidelines for 
comprising the best behavioural principles for cyber hygiene, as well as to create an e-learn-
ing platform, where these guidelines get implemented. The prototype, of the Cyber Hygiene 
e-learning course was implemented and tested in the Estonian Defence Forces in early 2016. 
This thesis builds up on this. It tries to clarify what data should be available to the specialists 
and what information should be reported to the management. This shall help to create the 
specialist and management level of the Initiative. The methodological foundation of the e-
learning course was well laid with other theses. This thesis introduces the methodology and 
shows the results, what kind of data and reporting should be implemented on the specialist- 
and management-level. Decision makers and managers have now an Executive summary 
available, to take specialists view into account and to implement proper reporting. Addi-
tional to many interviews with specialists and security experts, a questionnaire was created 
to raise coverage. The testing of the questionnaire was done at an international well known 
think tank. Results from the interviews and the survey indicated that the methodology proves 
to be valid for improving reporting and should help with implementation. The developed 
methodology and questions will be further considered at CybExer Technologies, a joint ven-
ture of BHC Lab and bytelife, who contracted with EDA for a period of 3 years at the end 
of 2016 to further improve the programme and include the specialist- and management- 
level. 
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TEE SPETSIALISTI JA JUHTKONNA TASEME SUUNAS 
KÜBERHÜGIEENI INITSIATIIVI RAAMES 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Küberruumi kuritarvitused, s.h küberkuritegevuse arvukus ja riikide huvides ning nende 
poolt toetatud spionaaž, näitavad jätkuvalt kasvutrendi. Samuti suureneb igapäevaselt 
küberintsidentidest mõjutatud organisatsioonide ja ettevõtete arv. Paljud neist saavad teada 
küberründe ohvriks langemisest suhteliselt ruttu, kuid esineb juhtumeid, kus sihtmärgil 
puudub võimekus oma turvasüsteemi lubamatut tungimist ise avastada. Küberintsidentide 
ja –rünnete peamiseks võimaldavaks faktoriks on saanud IT infrastruktuuri kasutaja. 
Kasutajast tuleneva riski maandamist raskendab asjaolu, et ei ole olemas kahte ühesuguse 
käitumismustriga inimest. Erinevused esinevad mistahes faktorites alates füsioloogilistest 
(sõrmejäljed) ja lõpetades teadmiste, kogemuse ja iseloomuomadustega. 
Küberruumis aktsepteeritavate käitumisjuhiste väljatöötamiseks ja rakendamiseks on ellu 
kutsutud ’Küberhügieeni initsiatiiv’, mille üheks kõrvaleesmärgiks on nimetatud reeglite 
kasutamist soodustava e-õppe platvormi loomine. Küberhügieeni e-õppe keskkonna 
testversiooni katsetas Eesti kaitsevägi esmakordselt 2016. aasta lõpus. Sellest katsetusest 
saadud kogemusest käesolev lõputöö räägibki. E-kursust aluseks võttes, analüüsib uurimus, 
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missugune informatsioon peaks olema tehtud kättesaadavaks IT spetsialistidele ja 
missugune informatsioon tuleks edastada juhtkonnale. Töö üheks eesmärgiks on aidata 
kaasa küberhügieeni initsiatiivi sees spetsialistide ja juhtkonna taseme loomisele ja 
eristamisele.  
E-õppe kursuse metoodiline alus sobitus hästi varasemate töödega. Antud töö tutvustab 
uurimuse tulemusi ja metoodikat, näitamaks missuguseid andmeid ja raporteerimist peaks 
rakendama nii spetsialistide kui ka juhtkonna tasemel. Juhtkonna ja juhataja jaoks on uueks 
võimaluseks intsidentide kokkuvõte, mis on võtnud arvesse spetsialistide teadmised, 
rakendamaks korrektset raporteerimist. Lisaks paljudele intervjuudele spetsialistidega ja 
turvalisuse ekspertidega, loodi laiema info saamiseks küsimustik. Küsimustiku tõhusust 
katsetati rahvusvaheliselt tuntud mõttekojas. Küsimustiku ja intervjuude tulemused viitavad 
sellele, et see metoodika on kehtiv, parandamaks raporteerimist ning vastumeetmete 
rakendamist. Väljatöötatud metoodikat ja küsimustikku on kavas rakendada küberõppusel, 
s.t. BHC Laboratory ja ByteLife’i ühisettevõtmisel, millel on 2016.aastal sõlmitud 3-aastane 
leping EDA’ga õppeprogrammi edasiarendamiseks ning spetsialistide ja juhtkonna taseme 
õppe lisamiseks. 
Võtmesõnad: 
küberhügieeni initsiatiiv, e-õpe, spetsialist, ekspert, juhtkond, raporteerimine 
CERCS: P170 Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine 
(automaatjuhtimisteooria) 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis adds up on theses for improving the general user-level of the Cyber Hygiene 
Initiative. The three foreseen levels for the training are correlating also with used standards 
and recommendations [32].⁠ It collects data from Cyber Security experts in form of inter-
views and a survey to identify what data is important to have for the specialists and what 
they think would be of value for the management to know. A proposal of information for 
reporting is given in the condensed form of an Executive summary for the management. It 
is now on managers to decide, what information of this list they want to get reported in what 
form and frequency. Especially in governmental organisations it seems to be a problem to 
implement business best practices. In this thesis, it is emphasized that payment is a factor 
for specialists to consider to change to better paid positions, so it is of utmost importance to 
treat their specialists in a proper manner and keep them motivated.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
Many security standards ask for basic user training. Under others NIST [25]⁠, COBIT [4]⁠, 
ISO [33]⁠, BSI [34]⁠, ISKE [15]⁠. What some managers in European Union still seem to be 
unaware of, is the applicability of EUROSOX [12], which gives responsibility to: “Assure 
effective corporate governance, internal controls and risk management.“. 
The Cyber Hygiene Initiative is a multilateral initiative to change that. The basic user level 
was tested on a nation-wide scale in the Estonian Defence Forces. The specialist- and man-
agement-level is still to be created. In the discussion and interviews with TUT and bytelife 
a possible way of implementing feedback in that programme was valuable. The following 
research questions are aiming at the specialists to develop a well-founded proposal from the 
expert-level. With that proposal, the management can decide, what information, they want 
to get reported in the form and frequency they need. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The development of the questions was driven from the need to gain a better understanding 
of expert knowledge, that should be transferred to the management level. The main source 
for the development of the questions to answer was the guidelines document (see Appendix 
3). 
 RQ 1: What statistical data to collect? 
 RQ 2: What to report? 
 RQ 3: What are the biggest threats? 
With the question 53 the respondents shall have the opportunity to give additional input and 
advice. The availability of open questions and comment fields shall grant the collection of 
unexpected and innovative answers from the respondents, to catch even information that 
was not thought of before. 
As a warm up, of what to expect, please notify how one the respondents phrased it: “If these 
above impediments are getting in my way and I cannot change them I will leave. There is 
not shortage of demand.” 
The development of the topic follows the chapters: 
Introduction, Background Information, Methodology, Implementation and Conclusion. 
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The starting conditions are rather good, because a test-version of basic user awareness train-
ing was already implemented, but the specialist- and management-level is still to be created 
and this thesis can give valuable input for the further improvement. 
1.3 Acknowledgements 
I must thank a lot of people who made this thesis possible. Being so proud, that I was al-
lowed to work at the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) as first 
representative of a partner nation, thankful for the acceptance I found at my work, at the 
university and Estonia itself, I hope I have seen enough examples from people in Estonia 
high up in the hierarchy, that were always reachable for requests, that I can follow that 
behaviour, to be reachable and open for needs from other people, the whole rest of my live. 
I have found a second home and even if my origin or my career might make it necessary to 
move on, I will stay the rest of my live connected to Estonia. Thank you everybody in Es-
tonia for the warm welcome and the amazing time you made possible for me. I want to thank 
my supervisors Sten Mäses and Raimundas Matulevičius for countless critical questions to 
increase the argumentative depth of statements, taking distance from too strong argumenta-
tion and having a proper understanding for what it means to work and study at the same 
time. Estonian governmental representatives for their openness to questions, their reacha-
bility and their support. Beginning with Mihkel Tikk, Director of Cyber Policy Department 
of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, Kusti Salm and Teet Laeks. Lauri Almann and Andrus 
Kivisaar from BHC Lab, Janek Gridin from bytelife, my workmates from the CCDCOE, 
especially Kenneth Geers for pointing me to his former research, Lauri Aasmann for trans-
lating my abstract to Estonian and Clare Lain for giving me the luxury to have a native 
English speaker as proof-reader. I want to thank Jimmy Heschl contributing to COBIT and 
Head of Digital Security at Red Bull, thank you for your refreshing approach to security. 
All the friends and colleagues I had the pleasure to get to know, and maybe even being 
sometimes annoying always wanting to speak about how to improve awareness training and 
all respondents. And thank you to all those who preferred to stay nameless in the fog of 
anonymity. And to those I counted mistakenly to that group, I apologise. Thank you all! 
 
1.4 The Contribution of the Author 
The implementation of Cyber Security, Cyber Defence and Cyber Awareness into the 
Agenda of states is an ongoing process. Many Nations came up with strategies that foresee 
the implementation of Cyber Security and give foresights in what they want to achieve. The 
how is often still a challenge. That is also valid for awareness and implementation of best 
practices. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to give answers on a possible way of implementing feedback 
in the specialist- and management-level in developing a well-founded proposal from the 
expert-level. With that proposal, the management can decide, what information, they want 
to get reported in the form and frequency they need. 
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The specific contribution of the author is: 
 Collecting expert and management data on a large scale, from Experts from Asia, 
America and Europe, on a level that is unusual for a thesis. 
 Creation of a re-usable and adaptable questionnaire, that is methodological mature, 
tested and delivering necessary data. 
 The creation of a short Executive summary, taking into account the input from high 
level individuals, stressing that they are too busy to read long reports and recom-
mendations. 
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2 Background Information 
Many security standards ask for basic user training. Under others NIST [23]⁠, COBIT [4]⁠, 
ISO [35]⁠, BSI [22]⁠, ISKE [36]. What some managers in European Union still seem to be 
unaware of, is the applicability of EUROSOX, which gives responsibility to: “Assure effec-
tive corporate governance, internal controls and risk management.” [12]. 
It is not as strict as the SOX that is applicable for the US, which states: “SOX auditing 
requires that internal controls and procedures can be audited using a control framework like 
COBIT. Log collection and monitoring systems must provide an audit trail of all access and 
activity to sensitive business information.” [37] 
A white-paper which tries to explain that, provided at the law oversight page of the US 
phrases it: “For the top management of a public company to discharge its obligations to 
oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, understand, and assess the factors 
that may cause the financial statements to be fraudulently misstated.” [38]⁠ 
References to training: “Principle 3: 
Senior management should have responsibility for implementing the operational risk man-
agement framework... and all levels of staff should understand their responsibilities with 
respect to operational risk management. Senior management should also have responsibility 
for developing policies, processes and procedures for managing operational risk in all... ma-
terial products, activities, processes and systems.” [38]⁠ 
And to make the intent clearer SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman summarized the intent 
of these sections in a speech on September 27, 2002 to the American Society of Corporate 
Secretaries. “Recognizing that awareness must precede action, Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Commission’s rules require the CEO and Board to make certain that procedures are in place 
to ensure that they hear bad news. Under the Commission’s recently adopted rules, these 
procedures must ensure that all material information - both financial and non-financial – 
gets to those responsible for reporting it to the investing public.” [38]⁠ 
But how to do it? What statistical data to collect, and what and how to report to the man-
agement? 
More and more governments [23]⁠ [39]⁠ try to take over business best practices [40]⁠. Still it 
seems that some governments struggle with adapting those practices. If future governments 
want to retain their employees and avoid a drain to economy, it will be of utmost importance 
to adapt to business best practices. But in doing so, they should also keep old words of 
wisdom at the back of their mind: “By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he 
administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This 
causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.” [41]⁠ Going for a basic user awareness training, 
is a good way to start, but once employees will be trained and skilled, they should also get 
paid properly. When payment is not the way the government of a nation can go, it should at 
least treat their employees well, otherwise there might be no way, to keep their skilled peo-
ple. The US government has proven it is more than aware of that [39]. 
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Incentives for three levels of experience are explicitly mentioned in their Cyber Security 
Workforce development kit [39]⁠. 
Tips to retain entry-level Staff 
 Foster an environment where diverse perspectives are welcome 
 Encourage two-way dialogue for open communication 
 Provide frequent feedback on job performance 
 Ensure that cyber professionals have quality supervision and mentorship 
 Provide opportunities to acquire new skills through established training, challenging 
job assignments, and career paths 
 Recognize staff for strong work performance 
Tips to retain Mid-career: 
 Emphasize work-life balance; encourage taking time to pursue activities and inter-
ests 
 Provide opportunities to obtain advanced training and certifications 
 Allow information sharing within the organization and professional forums 
 Offer challenging job assignments  
 Include employees in decision making and innovation 
 Implement reward programs 
Tips to retain Executive staff 
 Provide advanced training and development opportunities 
 Create tailored development plans that identify leadership competencies and areas 
for development 
 Recognize leaders for their successes and accomplishments 
 Consider performance and loyalty-based bonuses to retain staff 
 Promote cyber executives to develop intellectual capital and create information shar-
ing mechanisms 
 
2.1 Related Work 
Boeke is mainly dealing with the binary choice of putting Cyber Defenders into the Intelli-
gence community or not, but he also stresses the importance of training [42]⁠. 
Fellow colleagues from the Tallinn Technical university were writing about the Cyber Hy-
giene Initiative, mainly dealing with the basic user training level. Sumin’s thesis [43] is 
mainly dealing with the development of a scientific framework for improving the basic user 
training and the content. He agrees with Kevin Mitnick [44]⁠ that “People are the key factor 
to either success or failure of cyber security in organizations”. 
Suarez tested people after a cyber hygiene training by sending them phishing e-mails [45].⁠ 
An interesting aspect he mentions, is the preference for class room learning from students, 
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is surprisingly high. A conclusion, that goes further than his one, is that e-learning should 
be personally announced, advertised and a mentor programme for employees might be ben-
eficial. A main reason for creating an e-learning course is the big target audience and the 
cost related to train a big number of people. Nevertheless, it is important, that at each loca-
tion or office of an organisation, somebody takes care of the employees, especially the new 
ones. Mentoring programmes are one of the best practices proposed for tackling that issue. 
There is some research out there on how to create and validate basic user awareness training 
like the thesis of Veseli [46]⁠ from Norwegian Grovjik university. Her conclusion is, that 
besides social engineering campaigns, traditional class room lectures get the highest ac-
ceptance and improve of behaviour, but finally concludes also, that with big geographical 
scattering of the training audience, there is no way around web-based training. Gamification 
also seems to be a hot topic [47].⁠ 
Fredmund Malik’s book [48]⁠ is a proposal for a manager who wants to understand why the 
Germans are able to produce such a good quality of things, and are world market leaders in 
a lot of fields. 
The People Capability Maturity Model 
There is lots of literature about management, motivation and best practices. Managers 
should be aware of that. It is an estimation that most universities give at least an overview 
of those, but if that is wrong, there is a lot of literature out there for increasing management 
skills. What shall be pointed to, is the collection of best practices from the Carnegie Mellon 
university, that was also implemented in the new draft of the NIST standard of creating a 
capable workforce [23]. “The People Capability Maturity Model (People CMM) can help 
organizations successfully address their critical human capital issues. The People CMM em-
ploys a process maturity framework as a foundation for best practices for managing and 
developing an organization’s workforce. Based on the best current practices in fields such 
as human resources, knowledge management, and organizational development, the People 
CMM guides organizations in improving their processes for managing and developing their 
workforce. The People CMM helps organizations characterize the maturity of their human 
capital practices, establish a program of continuous workforce development, set priorities 
for improvement actions, integrate workforce development with process improvement, and 
establish a culture of excellence.” [3] But for some reasons governments sometimes struggle 
with the implementation. To research why, should be tackled in future work. For companies 
there are studies, why they are not performing to their best potential and proposals what to 
change. The following subchapter shows management failures and their solutions. 
Five Performance Management Failures and their Solutions 
Research from CEB, which unite 80% of the Fortune 1000 companies [49]⁠ is claiming, that 
the average company is harming it’s potential with failing performance management strate-
gies. Following you find a shortened overview, taken from their study. 
1 You don’t know what it is. 
Every organisation or firm has to figure out for themselves, what makes performance 
and performance management for them. 
First define it. 
Key process activities have not only to be reported, but also get used 
to increase the performance. Employee behaviour must be aligned 
with organizational objectives. 
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2 You do not prioritize objectives. 
Prioritize ruthlessly. 
3 It is too complex and insufficiently connected to your strategy. 
Focus on behaviours and milestones, not just high level metrics. 
4 It is not human. 
An increased contribution should also trigger an increase in reward or benefits. Per-
formance management systems must adapt to reward networked performance, en-
courage a new set of competencies, and enable collaboration across the enterprise. 
Only 23% of HR executives believe their performance management processes accu-
rately reflect employee contributions. 
Align business performance management to HR performance management. 
5 It does not create a climate that allows employees to adapt. 
Create an adaptable review system.  
Successful firms set escalation and divestment triggers ahead of time; 
reduce their metrics to the highly relevant; ensure their reviews look 
at changes to the operating environment before metrics; and regularly 
report on human capital, market, and operational factors, as well as 
financial factors [50]. 
2.2 Necessity of Awareness Training in relevant Security / IT/ Account-
ing Standards 
As stated above in the introduction to the main chapter, many security standards like NIST 
[20]⁠, COBIT [3]⁠, ISO [32]⁠, BSI [26]⁠ and ISKE [33] demand training and all-user training in 
their applicability and recognition, or certification according to that standard. In the follow-
ing subchapters, a short overview over the standards will be given. In general business com-
panies are doing feedback in their organisation and try to receive it from their customers. In 
the analogue world, an eminent method to get more information about the customer and 
bind him to the enterprise are customer cards, but the future is data itself [51] ⁠ [52] [53]⁠ [54].⁠ 
ISO 
The ISO, the International Organization for Standardization, develop and publish Interna-
tional Standards. For sure to mention here is the ISO-27000 family [55].⁠ 
ISO/IEC 27000:2016 Information technology, Security techniques, Information security 
management systems, Overview and vocabulary 
The one that your organisation could certify against is the next one: 
ISO/IEC 27001 - Information security management 
ISO/IEC 27002:2013 - Information technology, Security techniques, Code of practice for 
information security controls 
ISO/IEC 27003:2010 - Information technology, Security techniques, Information security 
management system implementation guidance 
ISO/IEC 27004:2009 - Information technology, Security techniques, Information security 
management, Measurement 
18 
 
When certifications are a topic, it is always worth mentioning one of the most standards, 
that companies certify against. 
ISO 9001:2015 - Quality management systems, Requirements 
interesting might also be: 
ISO 31000:2009 Risk management, Principles and guidelines 
NIST, NICE and NCWF 
The NIST, NICE and NCWF are aiming at increasing the cyber security in the US. 
NIST: The National Institute of Standards and Technology is a non-regulatory federal 
agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST's mission is to promote innovation 
and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technol-
ogy in ways that enhance economic security and improve the quality of life [56].⁠ 
NICE: The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), led by the National 
(US) Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is a partnership between government, 
academia, and the private sector focused on cybersecurity education, training, and work-
force development. The mission of NICE is to energize and promote a robust network and 
an ecosystem of cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development. NICE fulfils 
this mission by coordinating with government, academic, and industry partners to build on 
existing successful programs, facilitate change and innovation, and bring leadership and 
vision to increase the number of skilled cybersecurity professionals helping to keep the US 
secure [23].⁠ 
NCWF: The NICE Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (NCWF) is a national resource 
that categorizes and describes cybersecurity work. It provides employers, employees, edu-
cators, students, and training providers with a common language to define cybersecurity 
work as well as a common set of tasks and skills required to perform cybersecurity work. 
Through the process of identifying the cybersecurity workforce and using a standard set of 
terms they work together to educate, recruit, train, develop, and retain a highly-qualified 
workforce [23].⁠ 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is a law in the US and makes the use of frameworks oblig-
atory for public companies: “After consideration of the comments, we have modified the 
final requirements to specify that management must base its evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the company's internal control over financial reporting on a suitable, recognized control 
framework that is established by a body or group that has followed due-process procedures, 
including the broad distribution of the framework for public comment.” [57] like the fol-
lowing frameworks. 
COSO 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is a 
joint initiative of the five private sector organizations for accounting and auditing. It is ded-
icated to providing thought leadership through the development of frameworks and guid-
ance on enterprise risk management, internal control and fraud deterrence [5].⁠ 
SOX states: “The COSO Framework satisfies our criteria and may be used as an evaluation 
framework for purposes of management's annual internal control evaluation and disclosure 
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requirements.” [57] But the COSO frameworks aims more at governance and management 
for accuracy in accounting and auditing [5]. ⁠ 
The elegance in COBIT 5 which will be explained in the next subchapter is that it states:” 
Connect to, and, where relevant, align with, other major frameworks and standards in the 
marketplace, such as Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL®), The Open 
Group Architecture Forum (TOGAF®), Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK®), PRojects IN Controlled Environments 2 (PRINCE2®), Committee of Spon-
soring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) and the International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO) standards. This will help stakeholders understand how var-
ious frameworks, good practices and standards are positioned relative to each other and how 
they can be used together.” [58]⁠ 
COBIT 
COBIT 5: A Business Framework for the Governance and Management of Enterprise IT 
has clarified management level processes and integrated COBIT 4.1, Val IT [59]⁠ and Risk 
IT [60]⁠ content into one process reference model, but there are still some differences, like 
enablers were not called like that in COBIT 4.1. 
COBIT 5 is based on 5 key principles and 7 supporting enablers for governance and man-
agement of enterprise IT: 
• Principle 1: Meeting Stakeholder Needs 
• Principle 2: Covering the Enterprise End-to-end 
it integrates governance of enterprise IT into enterprise governance. It covers all functions 
and processes within the enterprise and considers all IT-related governance and manage-
ment enablers to be enterprise-wide and end-to-end, e.g. inclusive of everything and every-
one, internal and external, that is relevant to governance and management of enterprise in-
formation and related IT. 
• Principle 3: Applying a Single, Integrated Framework 
COBIT 5 aligns with other relevant standards and frameworks at a high level, and thus can 
serve as the overarching framework for governance and management of enterprise IT. 
• Principle 4: Enabling a Holistic Approach 
Efficient and effective governance and management of enterprise IT require a holistic ap-
proach, taking into account several interacting components. The COBIT 5 framework de-
fines seven categories of enablers: 
 Principles, Policies and Frameworks 
 Processes 
 Organisational Structures 
 Culture, Ethics and Behaviour  
 Information 
 Services, Infrastructure and Applications 
 People, Skills and Competencies  
• Principle 5: Separating Governance from Management 
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Governance ensures that stakeholder needs, conditions and options are evaluated to deter-
mine balanced, agreed-on enterprise objectives to be achieved; setting direction through pri-
oritisation and decision making; and monitoring performance and compliance against 
agreed-on direction and objectives.  
Management plans, builds, runs and monitors activities in alignment with the direction set 
by the governance body to achieve the enterprise objectives [58].⁠ 
The COBIT framework was created from 
ISACA®: With 95,000 constituents in 160 countries, ISACA (www.isaca.org) is a leading 
global provider of knowledge, certifications, community, advocacy and education on infor-
mation systems (IS) assurance and security, enterprise governance and management of IT, 
and IT-related risk and compliance. Founded in 1969, the non-profit, independent ISACA 
hosts international conferences, publishes the ISACA® Journal, and develops international 
IS auditing and control standards, which help its constituents ensure trust in, and value from, 
information systems. It also advances and attests IT skills and knowledge through the glob-
ally respected Certified Information Systems Auditor® (CISA®), Certified Information Se-
curity Manager® (CISM®), Certified in the Governance of Enterprise IT® (CGEIT®) and 
Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control TM (CRISCTM) designations. ISACA 
continually updates COBIT®, which helps IT professionals and enterprise leaders fulfil 
their IT governance and management responsibilities, particularly in the areas of assurance, 
security, risk and control, and deliver value to the business [58].⁠ 
BSI Grundschutz 
The German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, or Federal Office for 
Information Security in English provides with the BSI Grundschutz (base line protection) a 
framework and guidance that is far more detailed than the rather generous ISO/IEC stand-
ards. The aim is to achieve an appropriate security level for all types of information of an 
organisation. IT-Grundschutz uses a holistic approach to this process. Through proper ap-
plication of well-proven technical, organisational, personnel, and infrastructural safeguards, 
a security level is reached that is suitable and adequate to protect business-related infor-
mation having normal protection requirements. In many areas, IT-Grundschutz even pro-
vides advice for IT systems and applications requiring a high level of protection. The nice 
thing here, is, that it automatically fulfils the requirements for a certification against ISO/ 
IEC 27001 and due to it’s still big size it was also the starting point for the Estonian ISKE, 
that further compresses this big load of basic protection measures [34]. 
⁠ 
ISKE 
The preparation and development of ISKE is based on a German information security stand-
ard – IT Baseline Protection Manual (IT-Grundschutz in German) – which has been adapted 
to suit the Estonian situation. ISKE is compulsory for state and local government organisa-
tions who handle databases/registers [15].⁠ 
A three-level baseline system means three different sets of security measures for three dif-
ferent security requirements have been developed (different databases and information sys-
tems may have different security levels). 
But on the example of dealing with health-data, even representatives from the Estonian min-
istry of social affairs had to admit: “Additionally, from the Ministry’s perspective, the train-
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ing of healthcare professionals and persuading them to use these unified standards, classifi-
cations and nomenclatures in making entries to ENHIS takes time and effort.” [61]⁠ Even 
when they were speaking about the standards of putting the data in the Estonian National 
Health Information System (ENHIS), it shows at least initial training is necessary, with new 
developments. 
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3 Methodology 
In the following subchapters, the history and methodology of the development of the thesis 
will be explained. Structured in timeline, which explains the timely sequence of events, from 
getting aware of the topic, until decision to write the thesis on that topic and relevant events 
that happened. The next subchapter elaborates on the opportunity, that was used to leverage 
communication with experts at all. In the process of developing this thesis, several experts 
were spoken with. Mainly semi-structured interviews and structured interviews were con-
ducted. Coordination meetings were held in ministries of defence, mainly the Estonian and 
the companies developing the content. A subchapter is explaining the Cyber Hygiene Initi-
ative. The next subchapter sheds some light on getting support, the next one on the Research 
questions and how the development and testing of the questionnaire was done. Finally the 
target audience is explained. 
 
3.1 Timeline 
In the Figure 1 a timeline is given from the signature of the Pledge to mitigate Human-
related Risks in Cyber space by launching the Cyber Hygiene Initiative. Only the main 
events with direct relation to the thesis are shown. Single opportunities for interviews, like 
MNCD-workshops, EDA-events, TNA-workshops and single appointments are not in-
cluded, because there was no direct impact to the development of the Initiative. Locked 
shields participants made the target audience for the survey and at the CyCon, the Initiative 
was introduced to a wider audience. 
 
 
Figure 1 timeline 
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3.2 Taking Advantage of the Opportunity 
The position as Staff Officer in the Education and Exercise branch at the CCDCOE gave 
valuable insights in mutual perspectives. Working there in the International project groups, 
like assistance to a NATO-wide awareness campaign and assistance to ACT in their role as 
Department Head for Cyber Defence, gave countless opportunities to speak with interna-
tional experts in various workshops on that topics. So, there was opportunity to speak with 
representatives of ministries and nations all over the world. Leading 2 projects at my work 
and including into that projects, representing the CCDCOE to other organisations and events 
gave plenty of opportunities to speak to experts. There was possibility to observe as a stake-
holder in the Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training project. In the project 
assistance to Department Head assisting ACT there were structured interview workshops 
organised. The role as observer for the CCDCOE in the Project Team Cyber Defence at the 
EDA gave another opportunity to speak to experts. Even 2 authors of the DCWF could be 
spoken with. Various experts from universities from different nations and representatives of 
the NCIA were conversation partners. Furthermore, there was opportunity to speak with the 
chiefs of NATO NCIRC and EU-CERT. 
3.3 Cyber Hygiene Initiative 
In late 2015 there was a notification to participate in the prototype presentation for the Cyber 
Defence Initiative as national representative. After attending that meeting, it seemed, that 
only writing a report, about that one event, would not be sufficient any more. Interest was 
woken and further involvement seemed to be interesting. This thesis deals with that and 
more information is to be found in the Appendices. Initially started as bilateral initiative 
under the Latvian presidency of the European Union between Estonian and Latvia, soon 
other nations joined the Initiative. Estonia contracted BHC Lab for the content creation in 
cooperation with TUT. 
3.4 Getting Support 
In creating the survey and during first feedback conversations the issue of sensitivity came 
up. To enable a better participation and reduce the uncertainty at the side of the fillers of the 
questionnaire, several measures were taken. Estonian MOD was contacted to get support 
for a thesis and a questionnaire granted. See Appendix 4. Further interviews with BHC Lab, 
bytelife and CybExer Technologies were conducted to get a better understanding, what 
problems were still unsolved and to tackle. The basic user training was quite sufficient cov-
ered already, but support for the experts-level and outlook to the management-level was 
appreciated. 
3.5 Development and Testing of the Questionnaire 
In addition to experts-interviews, a questionnaire was created and tested with the personnel 
of the CCDCOE to collect more expert-input. 3 test-versions were tested and with the feed-
back given, the final questionnaire developed and the survey conducted. That enabled an 
even broader perspective, than solely interviews would have allowed. 
3.6 Target Audience 
Target audience were several well-known experts and the mailing list of the biggest multi-
national technical cyber defence exercise in the world: Locked Shields. The expected num-
ber of experts to reach with the invitation to fill the survey was 200-250 and with a return 
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quote of 28 the expected 10% [8] ⁠return was over expectancy. Filtering out the incomplete 
answers, still 14 were left and out of these 7 technical specialists from various well known 
organisations were left, and 2 even would have agreed on getting cited with their name. 
Answers came from NATO, NCIA, Royal Holloway university, US Airforce, Belgian 
MOD, Romanian Education Centre DRESMARA, civilian company, and of course the 
CCDCOE. All participants of the survey are well known experts in their field and combined 
with the conducted interviews it can be stated that the outcome is well based on expert-
knowledge, even when the numbers could have been bigger. Experts in that field are scarce, 
and most of them are overloaded with their duties. There is high confidence to express what 
the community of International experts would like to tell the management. It is not a claim 
to speak for all experts, though. 
As additional benefit might be considered that the building of the questionnaire was coordi-
nated with a former expert [62]⁠ of the CCDCOE who conducted research and questionnaire 
for a PHD thesis. 
Locked Shields 
The Locked Shields [16]⁠ is a technical life-fire exercise. It is the biggest and most advanced 
international live-fire cyber defence exercise in the world. In 2016 20 blue teams defending 
“their” networks as incident responders were involved in Locked Shields 2016. The exercise 
is organised each year, since 2010 by the Tallinn-based CCDCOE, and focuses on training 
the of security experts who protect national IT systems on a daily basis. Over 550 people 
and a total of 26 nations were involved in Locked Shields 2016. 20 Blue Teams representing 
19 nations and NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) participated in the 
exercise. Some teams were joint teams, which means that nations teamed up. While the 
organizers of the exercise were gathered in Tallinn, Estonia, the participating Blue Teams 
had online access to the exercise networks and most worked from their home countries [9]. 
The Blue Teams are tasked to maintain the networks and services of a fictional country, 
Berylia under intense pressure. This includes handling and reporting incidents, solving fo-
rensic challenges as well as responding to legal, media and scenario injects. 
Realistic technologies, networks and attack methods were in the focus of Locked Shields 
2016 to stay abreast with market developments. More than 1700 possible attacks were car-
ried out against Blue Teams and over 1500 virtualised systems were deployed during 
Locked Shields 2016. The virtual Blue Team networks are custom-built and include a vari-
ety of services and platforms. For example, the Blue Teams had to maintain several servers, 
online services and an industrial control system. 
Locked Shields 2016 was organised in cooperation with the Estonian Defence Forces, the 
Finnish Defence Forces, the Swedish Defence College, the British Army, the United States 
European Command, and numerous other partners [16]. 
Global Programming and Department Head 
The Project of assistance to ACT in their role as Department Head for Cyber Defence gave 
countless opportunities to speak with international experts in various workshops on those 
topics. It gave opportunity to speak with experts throughout NATO. The global program-
ming is NATO’s approach to and worldwide (including partners) [63]⁠ coordination of edu-
cation and individual training. The main policies [64]⁠ and directives [65] [66]⁠ [67]⁠ are reg-
ulating the education, individual training, collective training and exercises for NATO. At 
the moment there are negotiations ongoing between ACT and the steering committee [68]⁠ 
of the CCDCOE to transfer the role of the Department Head from ACT to CCDCOE to 
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coordinate all education offers for the NATO field of speciality, called the Discipline: Cyber 
Defence in NATO. 
MNCD 
The mission of this project is to fulfil Nations’ and NATO’s CD E&T shortfalls identified 
in the GAP analysis that will be performed in cooperation with ACT, in order to support 
Nations and NATO to comply with NDPP Capability Targets. Offers Allies CD E&T Ac-
tivities (from strategic to technical level) not available through NATO, national, bilateral or 
commercial arrangements; contributes to NCIS & Cyber School Capability Building links 
ACT Gap Analysis with NCIS&CS future activities; promotes NATO Certification high 
quality of courses and interoperability of experts; Multinational Character greater flexibility 
and benefits with participation of EU, Industry and Partners [69]  
 
EDA 
The European Defence Agency [9] supports the Member States of the European Union and 
the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis 
management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and 
develops in the future. They have 3 mission statements: 
 supporting the development of European defence capabilities and military coopera-
tion;  
 stimulating defence Research and Technology (R&T) and strengthening the Euro-
pean defence industry;  
 acting as a military interface to EU policies.  
EDA acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives and introduces 
solutions to improve defence capabilities. It is the place where Member States willing to 
develop capabilities in cooperation do so. It is also a key facilitator in developing the capa-
bilities necessary to underpin the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Union [70]. 
One of their capability programmes deals with Cyber Defence and aims at technology and 
education [3]. As representative of the CCDCOE as observer to the Project Team Cyber 
Defence, it was also an opportunity to speak to high level representatives, that are usually 
hard to reach for interviews. 
CyCon 
The International Conference on Cyber Conflict is organised by the NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Every year, over 500 decision-makers and experts 
from government, military and industry from all over the world approach the conference’s 
key theme from legal, technology and strategy perspectives, often in an interdisciplinary 
manner. CyCon 2017 will focus on the fundamental aspects of cyber security with a theme 
of Defending the Core. The 9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict will be held in 
Tallinn May 30 through June 2, 2017 [6].  
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4 Implementation 
With a target audience for the survey spread over the globe, it was an obvious conclusion to 
use automated tools for collecting the needed data with the survey. There are plenty of tools 
available, but surveymonkey is mentioned in almost every overview of tools [25]⁠ [69]. That 
was one reason to choose surveymonkey. The most practical reason to use surveymonkey 
was, that it is already in use at the CCDCOE for collecting all kinds of feedback, especially 
from the Courses, the CCDCOE offers.  
After the test run with the ILIAS-based awareness-training, there will be follow-on activity 
with a new 3 years EDA contract for further improving the Cyber Hygiene Initiative together 
with the joint-venture CybExer Technologies.  
During the Pilot-iteration of a high-level seminar at the CCDCOE end of November 2016, 
results were already implemented on a General-rank-level-course, that also was attended 
from the Ambassadors of Austria and Ireland to the Republic of Estonia. Their Feedback is 
also implemented in the Executive Summary. 
Different approaches to education were also discussed during CyCon, e-learning was part 
of that discussion [72].⁠ 
4.1 Development and Testing of Questionnaire 
Over the timeframe from march to August 2016 3 versions of a questionnaire were tested, 
based on interviews, with written and oral feedback the final version was created in August 
2016. 
Several interviews were conducted with the representative from the Estonian Defence 
Forces, MSc student in parallel and responsible for the implementation of the Cyber Hy-
giene Initiative to the Estonian Defence Forces. He gave a lot of valuable feedback for the 
questionnaire, already reflecting the feedback he was receiving. 
Various experts gave valuable input. To just name a view Wolfgang Röhrig Project Officer 
from the European Defence Agency, Paulo Nunes the Project Lead from the NATO Smart 
Defence project MNCD Multinational Cyber Defence project for education and training, 
Stefanie Shively from the US Ministry of Defence, working on the DCWF Development of 
a capable cyber workforce, the draft for the NIST standard was just released on time in 
November 2016 [6].⁠ 
After the development of the test-versions Draft in March 2016, Version 0.5 in April 2016 
and Version 0.8 in July 2016 of the questionnaire and testing with the personnel of the 
CCDCOE, the questionnaire Version 1.0 was separated in the main questionnaire with the 
relevant questions for the thesis and additional questions in August 2016, that were identi-
fied as still interesting for the CCDCOE, but without direct impact for the thesis. All together 
55 questions were asked in the final questionnaire. 
A grouping of questions to topics seems to be possible and the results will be presented 
according to that grouping. 
Grouping of the questions, as far as applicable, is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Grouping of survey questions 
grouping Question number 
target audience verification 1 
comfort creation and personal data 2, 54, 55 
Education 3, 43 
Experience, ability 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 
perceived threats and policies 4, 6 
confidence, self-discipline and validation 5, 26, 27, 28, 39, 40, 41,  
workload 10 
circumstances allowing collaborative behav-
iour and testing 
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 44, 
45, 46, 47, 48 
advice and optional proposals to the manage-
ment 
23, 25, 53 
“current success” in reporting: 26 
motivation, demotivation, danger of losing 
experts 
9, 49, 50, 51, 52 
outsiders 20 
Initiative specific 21, 22 
“What is at stake?”: cooperation success and 
danger in (critical infrastructure) protection 
(risk and risk management) 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 
 
4.2 Presentation of Main Results 
The main audience was foreseen to be the technical specialist. Still the majority was feeling 
they belong to the management. It seems to be fair to assume that this is not that kind of 
management, that is responsible for implementation of basic user training now. But time 
goes by and if in the future, they will have higher positions, and keep in mind there was this 
survey once, 
one of the objectives of this thesis: to increase awareness, was reached already.  
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The target audience could be reached, even when management numbers were higher, nev-
ertheless valuable information for what and how to report from the specialist level to the 
management was collected. 
Personal data was given quite often, so it is concluded that comfort creation was well re-
ceived. The rate of people stopping to fill, during filling the questionnaire was lower as 
expected, with a questionnaire containing 55 questions [73].⁠ 
Education was quite high, but that was expected, due to aiming at specialists. The average 
was far over the average in the population [74]. 
 
Figure 2 education of the specialists 
Even when the education is quite high already, the specialists are willing to continue learn-
ing. The way they want to do it, is shown in the following Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 specialists training preferences 
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The answers about experience and ability show that the respondents were highly experi-
enced, able and honest in their answers. 
The perceived threats and policies are mainly congruent with research of Antivirus vendors 
of what to expect in the future [75].⁠ 
The respondents showed that they are aware of the importance of self-discipline and mainly 
show confidence and self-discipline [76].⁠  
The respondents mainly stated that the workload does not allow a proper inspection of the 
traffic in their organisations. That can have devastating consequences [77].⁠ 
Most of the respondents show that they would value circumstances allowing collaborative 
behaviour and testing, but also that they are sometimes not even allowed to conduct testing 
[78]⁠ [79].⁠ That will be shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 specialists answer if they are allowed to conduct testing 
The advice and optional proposals to the management are presented in the Executive sum-
mary and all the proposals can be seen in Appendix 5 
“Current success” in reporting to the management was surprisingly well perceived. Why 
there is still struggle to implement all the proposals, has to be content of future work. 
 
The majority of specialists either answered that there is a chance that they might change to 
a better paid position in the economy, or did not want to answer. That is one of the main 
indicators, that either salaries for experts should be raised, or at least the treatment should 
be excellent to avoid the risk of losing them. This will be shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 likeliness of specialists changing in a better paid business position 
The majority of the respondents think, that outside of the professional environment, only 
about 25% of the population understand the basics of computers and computer security. That 
indicates that the education systems are not yet delivering what the people need to survive 
in a digital society [80].⁠ 
More than half of the respondents have heard about the Cyber Hygiene Initiative before the 
survey and the majority welcomes the narration based approach. 
There seems to be a good awareness under the respondents about “What is at stake?”: co-
operation success and dangers in critical infrastructure protection is highly spread. Future 
work should guarantee, that this risks are mirrored in Cyber security strategies [81].⁠ 
Figure 6 shows the answers to the question 1: Please rate which group you think you belong 
to. 
 
Figure 6 perceived groups of participants 
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It seems to be obvious from the table, but it shall still be mentioned, that multiple answers 
were possible to this question. The following figures in this chapter are filtered for complete 
and specialist results, that means it shows only the data from the respondents, that declared 
themselves as specialist and the questionnaires were filled completely. When deviating from 
it, it will be mentioned. In the following figures the filtered results are shown. 3 out of seven 
7 specialists are also tasked with management tasks. 
 
 
Figure 7 survey data filtered for specialists 
All results are available in Appendix 5. The last 2 questions, question 54: Respondent details 
containing personal data will be removed. Question 55: Do you agree to get cited with your 
name, was consequently removed also, even when 2 respondents would have agreed to that. 
Most the experts hold a university degree or certification. Interestingly, that is not the case 
with management positions.  
Experience and Ability 
Interesting is that the specialists rate other specialists and themselves as very good or good. 
The fact, that they grade the specialists in their organisation even higher as themselves, show 
some modesty and honesty and let conclude, that the answers were given quite open and 
frankly. Figure 8 shows the perceived quality of experts. The answers from the filtered for 
completeness and being specialist to question 7: How would you rate the quality (character, 
willingness to work and further educate themselves) of the IT security *personnel* that is 
currently in place? For simplicity reasons, the categorisation of answers, or the categories 
of agreement, were kept as often as possible, throughout the questionnaire, to avoid confu-
sion at the respondent, and was direct outcome of the feedback from testing. Strongly agree 
can be understood as rated as very good, following that logic. 
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Figure 8 quality of personnel 
 
The impression of honesty in the answers is even deepened in the answers to the perceived 
own skill-set available. The further questions for experience also shows that experts were 
reached, 57% were even involved in a cyber intrusion investigation and 2 even in a court 
case, almost all state they are having contacts to a CERT. 
Other relevant Findings 
The ranking of threats also shows that these experts mainly come to the same conclusions 
like vendors for security solutions [23] [65] [83].⁠ 
The main findings and conclusions are densed in an Executive summary, that you find in 
the following chapter. Conversations and semi-structured interviews with experts and high-
level decision-makers gave the advice to keep it as short as possible. The vice-chancellor of 
the Republic of Austria gave that advice also, when I had the chance to discuss the idea with 
him, during a visit of a presidential visit with a delegation to Estonia at a time, where he still 
was minister. 
Executive Overview to the Management 
 Define for yourself what makes an expert for you and your organisation. Indicators 
can be: 
o university degree 
o certificates 
o courses 
o knowledge 
o skills 
o attitude 
o experience 
o testing, yes/ no 
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 There is no right or wrong. They have to fulfil their tasks, and you 
have to be sure they’re doing the right things in the right way. 
 Once you got experts in your organisation: treat and pay them right, otherwise you 
might lose them. 
 Experts have to learn a lot, that usually means they are highly intrinsically motivated. 
Keep them motivated. 
 Regularly train your employees, and your experts. Experts want to be on the cutting 
edge, allow them to courses of industry, even when they are expensive. Malfunction 
could be even more expensive. 
 Make sure their work-load is right. 
 Ensure they feel their work is meaningful. 
 Ask the right things for reporting. 
o in the form and frequency most suitable for you. 
o Explain why the reporting is important 
 No reporting for the sake of doing it, ask your employees, so they feel 
valued and their participation gives them a feeling of appreciation. 
According to this survey data that could be asked: 
 Basic training participation (min. annually) 
 number of incidents in comparison with former period 
 choose period wisely and according to your organisa-
tion, minimum annually, or quarterly, monthly, 
weekly, daily 
 shortfalls 
 number of requests for new functionality 
 Give clear guidance for situations where workarounds are appropriate and where 
not. (Enable mission commander to deviate, but in a guided manner. Missions them-
selves are a high-risk event, risk management has to take the higher level of risk-
acceptance into account) 
 Policies should include acceptable times for implementing new functionalities 
 Have a process for improvement proposals from the employees to be noticed and 
heard. 
o Consider awards for good proposals. Keep motivation up. 
 Give clear guidance for prioritisation 
 Balance business needs with security 
o risks can also be accepted, when the potential gain justifies it, but highest 
level has to decide, or at least give guidance 
 Allow, enable and conduct crisis and recovery testing. The outcome might be horri-
ble, but a real crisis might be even worse. Find your right frequency (min. annually). 
 Scenarios to train: 
o social engineering like e-mail fishing campaigns 
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o security audits 
o power outage 
o server breakdown 
o break-in attempts 
o phone system is not working. 
 Create a good culture of communication in your organisation. 
 Risk management is a high management/ leadership responsibility. 
o Be sure to give priorities according to the business needs. 
 Resources have to be sufficient for the given priorities. 
 Further improve reporting 
o Ask your employees what they want to report /what they want you to know 
o automatise reporting 
o continuously improve reporting better metrics for main security areas 
o benchmarking 
o take losses into account, financial and reputational 
MOD is the last resort of a state, so there have to be differences to firms. For a state, it is 
just no option to stand still and let an insurance jump in and pay for the damage, so there 
must be differences in crisis management and in preparation for it, and how much of the 
budget can be spent for that. The 2 % of the GDP that NATO asks, is still lower than the 
proposals from a 2.24% that are proposed for an average family in America for insuring 
your belongings [84].⁠ 
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5 Conclusions 
It seems to be good practice to cite a wise man from the past in the field of Cyber Security. 
This chance shall be used. The threats, risks and opportunities may seem endless and new, 
but already over 2500 years ago, the people were confronted with endless numbers: “There 
are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of 
them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.” [41] 
This thesis mainly answered the most important research questions, that were identified in 
interviews with experts, literature research, the conducted survey and the conclusions drawn 
from it. For the reporting, it gives proposals, what the specialists see as important, and they 
think the management should know. It is on the gouvernance and management now, to val-
idate, and give guidance in what form and frequency they want to be informed. Due to their 
responsibilities for risk management and accounting, they should at least be interested. 
5.1 Main Questions 
The main questions that should be answered were: 
What statistical Data to collect? 
Basic training participation (min. annually) 
 number of incidents in comparison with former period 
 choose period wisely and according to your organisa-
tion, minimum annually, or quarterly, monthly, 
weekly, daily 
 shortfalls 
 number of requests for new functionality 
What to report? 
That has to be determined by the management in cooperation with their specialists and their 
employees. The more involvement the employees and specialists sense, the higher their mo-
tivation will remain. All employees have their role in recognising break-in attempts, social 
engineering, or recognising, if a system, like the phone system is not working and to know 
where to report unusual events. A proposal from expert’s perspective is offered. 
What are the biggest Threats? 
Abuse of vulnerabilities, that comes with the technology. It is a never-ending challenge for 
security personnel. Security is a process, not a product [85].⁠ 
In ranking out of this survey, the experts rank following as top 5 
Bring your own device BYOD 
Spread of malware through removable media 
Abuse of authentication mechanisms (e.g. weak passwords) 
Abuse of wireless access points 
Social engineering 
Following the 6 seemingly most urgent quotes are given 
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As one of the respondents phrased it: “If these above impediments are getting in my way 
and I cannot change them I will leave. There is not shortage of demand.” 
Besides the opportunity to comment on all questions, 
Question 53 was dedicated to collect additional input: If you could advise your national 
leadership, what specific recommendations would you have to help your government or 
organisation to achieve a higher level of cyber security? 
 
“Educate the management to understand security. See security as part of business/govern-
ance process, not as an independent silo that dictates rules without consideration for its im-
pact on business.” 
“Start with cyber risk management at the highest level in order to ensure that the critical 
assets have been properly defined so that policies, controls and priorities can be defined in 
line with business/operational needs.” 
“Everyone should have a basic understanding of cyber security. It is not just a matter for 
technical people. The government's current initiatives are doing well in this area (education 
and awareness) and should continue.” 
“Be honest about the "inconvenience" of maintaining good cyber security. On the business 
side the need to improve security systems, and on the general population side, the need to 
keep more personal information private.” 
“National Cyber-Awareness Centre including ALL Stakeholder from the public sector with 
participation from the private sector (CI).” 
The Final Question 
But how to do it? What statistical data to collect, and what and how to report to the man-
agement? 
This was the goal of this thesis and there is hope it provides answers to the problems stated 
in the Introduction. The further development of the Cyber Hygiene Initiative will show how 
successful the implementation of a system, that trains all users, gives the specialists the data 
that are important, and finally find a channel to the management, to tell the bad news, that 
sometimes it seems nobody wants to bring or receive. 
5.2 Call for Action 
The specialists view is given. Not really for the 1st time. It is now on decision-makers and 
management to implement the proposals. The top-level support was given at the Warsaw-
summit [86]⁠ including the Cyber Defence pledge. The 2nd row has to act now. No further 
excuses should be found. The political will took too long to build, but now it is articulated 
and signed. 
In case the knowledge how to implement this measures is not there, build it up, or delegate 
to proper personnel as soon as possible. 
5.3 Future Work 
Future work and latest developments are presented in this subchapter. 
In the last interview in the beginning of November 2016 with BHC Lab [39]⁠, bytelife [40]⁠ 
and CybExer Technologies [41]⁠ it was told that a three years’ contract with EDA was en-
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tered to further develop the programme and a transition away from ILIAS to a new to de-
velop platform is considered. The validation of that new approach is for sure a promising 
topic for further research. 
The results of the questionnaire that was conducted as additional questions should be further 
researched. 
More feedback from the experts’ community and research on the management-level how to 
convince them to implement best practices, benchmarking and implementation of new de-
velopments. 
“Current success” in reporting to the management was surprisingly well perceived. Why 
there is still struggle to implement all the proposals has to be content of future work. 
What management really wants to know and what happens with reports are for sure an in-
teresting topic for future research. 
There seems to be a good awareness under the respondents about “What is at stake?”: co-
operation success and dangers in critical infrastructure protection is highly spread. 
But for some reasons governments sometimes struggle with the implementation. Those 
reasons should be addressed in future research. 
⁠ 
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Appendix 
I. Executive Overview to the management 
 Define for yourself what makes an expert for you and your organisation. Indicators 
can be: 
o university degree 
o certificates 
o courses 
o knowledge 
o skills 
o attitude 
o experience 
o testing, yes/ no 
 There is no right or wrong. They have to fulfil their tasks, and you 
have to be sure they’re doing the right things in the right way. 
 Once you got experts in your organisation: treat and pay them right, otherwise you 
might lose them. 
 Experts have to learn a lot, that usually means they are highly intrinsically motivated. 
Keep them motivated. 
 Regularly train your employees, and your experts. Experts want to be on the cutting 
edge, allow them to courses of industry, even when they are expensive. Malfunction 
could be even more expensive. 
 Make sure their work-load is right. 
 Ensure they feel their work is meaningful. 
 Ask the right things for reporting. 
o in the form and frequency most suitable for you. 
o Explain why the reporting is important 
 No reporting for the sake of doing it, ask your employees, so they feel 
valued and their participation gives them a feeling of appreciation. 
According to this survey data that could be asked: 
o Basic training participation (min. annually) 
o number of incidents in comparison with former period 
 choose period wisely and according to your organisa-
tion, minimum annually, or quarterly, monthly, 
weekly, daily 
o shortfalls 
o number of requests for new functionality 
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 Give clear guidance for situations where workarounds are appropriate and where 
not. (Enable mission commander to deviate, but in a guided manner. Missions them-
selves are a high-risk event, risk management must take the higher level of risk-
acceptance into account) 
 Policies should include acceptable times for implementing new functionalities 
 Have a process for improvement proposals from the employees to be noticed and 
heard. 
o Consider awards for good proposals. Keep motivation up. 
 Give clear guidance for prioritisation 
 Balance business needs with security 
o risks can also be accepted, when the potential gain justifies it, but highest 
level must decide, or at least give guidance 
 Allow, enable and conduct crisis and recovery testing. The outcome might be horri-
ble, but a real crisis might be even worse. Find your right frequency (min. annually). 
 Scenarios to train: 
o social engineering like e-mail fishing campaigns 
o security audits 
o power outage 
o server breakdown 
o break-in attempts 
o phone system is not working. 
 Create a good culture of communication in your organisation. 
 Risk management is a high management/ leadership responsibility. 
o Be sure to give priorities according to the business needs. 
 Resources must be sufficient for the given priorities. 
 Further improve reporting 
o Ask your employees what they want to report /what they want you to know 
o automatise reporting 
o continuously improve reporting better metrics for main security areas 
o benchmarking 
o take losses into account, financial and reputational 
MOD is the last resort of a state, so there have to be differences to firms. For a state, it is 
just no option to stand still and let an insurance jump in and pay for the damage, so there 
must be differences in crisis management and in preparation for it, and how much of the 
budget can be spent for that. The 2 % of the GDP that NATO asks, is still lower than the 
proposals from a 2.24% that are proposed for an average family in America [82]. 
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